Abstract Redundant techniques are widely adopted in vehicle management computer (VMC) to ensure that VMC has high reliability and safety. At the same time, it makes VMC have special characteristics, e.g., failure correlation, event simultaneity, and failure self-recovery. Accordingly, the reliability and safety analysis to redundant VMC system (RVMCS) becomes more difficult. Aimed at the difficulties in RVMCS reliability modeling, this paper adopts generalized stochastic Petri nets to establish the reliability and safety models of RVMCS. Then this paper analyzes RVMCS operating states and potential threats to flight control system. It is verified by simulation that the reliability of VMC is not the product of hardware reliability and software reliability, and the interactions between hardware and software faults can reduce the real reliability of VMC obviously. Furthermore, the failure undetected states and false alarming states inevitably exist in RVMCS due to the influences of limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of fault monitoring devices (FMD). RVMCS operating in some failure undetected states will produce fatal threats to the safety of flight control system. RVMCS operating in some false alarming states will reduce utility of RVMCS obviously. The results abstracted in this paper can guide reliable VMC and efficient FMD designs. The methods adopted in this paper can also be used to analyze other intelligent systems' reliability.
Introduction
As the core of aircraft control and management, vehicle management computer (VMC) integrates functions of flight control, survey equipment management, navigation and flight status management together. Ensuring that VMC has perfect function, good performance, and high reliability becomes a key task in flight control system design. [1] [2] [3] [4] In order to improve VMC's flight mission reliability and safety, redundant techniques [5] [6] [7] [8] are popularly adopted, for example, world-famous modern fighters (such as F-16, F/A-18, EF2000) popularly adopt quadruple-redundant VMC to reduce potential disasters due to single VMC's failure. At the same time, fault monitoring devices (FMD), such as built-in test (BIT) are widely adopted in redundant vehicle management computer system (RVMCS) to realize fault detection and isolation. 9 Ideally, reliability and safety of RVMCS is higher than that of single VMC with the assumptions that FMD can correctly detect and isolate system's failures with 100% possibility while false detection never occurs. With special characteristics, such as failure correlation, event simultaneity, and failure self-recovery, reliability and safety analysis for RVMCS becomes more complicated. In the traditional analysis for RVMCS, reliability block diagram (RBD)-based or fault tree analysis (FTA)-based models are established according to the structure and composition of RVMCS. 10 However, FTA-based and RBD-based models can only describe logical combinations among VMC elements' failures (e.g., processor, system disc, software, etc.) while they are difficult to deal with fault interactions which widely exist in RVMCS. Moreover, impact of software failures on RVMCS generally is inadequate in traditional RVMCS reliability modeling analysis. Even though many publications [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] have been devoted to the availability analysis of combined hardware and software systems, work on both aspects which are dealt with at the same time is not prevalent. Moreover, even when hardware and software aspects are considered together for real systems, the sources of faults are not explicitly distinguished. Therefore, the traditional reliability modeling methods are unavailable to analyze RVMCS reliability and survivability accurately because they cannot reflect actual RVMCS failure mechanism. In addition, analysis of redundant airborne computer in literature mainly focuses on redundancy structures and management strategies, onboard computer tests, BIT false alarms and solving strategies. 9 Ref. 9 studies the triplicated system reliability and respectively analyzes influence over one and two monitoring coverage on system reliability. For ignoring system self-recovery and impact of false alarm rate, the analysis results in Ref. 18 have certain limitations. In this case, generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN) are adopted to analyze complicated systems with self-recovery and FMD. 19, 20 Ref. 19 adopts GSPN to build a reliability model of dual-redundant switcher systems and preliminarily analyzes relevant relationship between software failures and hardware failures. However, this model only considers the influence of hardware failures on software reliability without analyzing the possible impact that software abnormal operation exerts on hardware operating. At the same time, missing rate and false alarm rate are not considered in reliability modeling, so accordingly, potential safety hazards of the system cannot be obtained.
Based on the key issues in current RVMCS reliability and survivability analysis, this paper analyzes RVMCS failure mechanism, and then establishes a single-board compute model based on the mechanism of software and hardware failures by advantages of GSPN hierarchy and modular modeling. Then, on the basis of this, an airborne redundancy switch model is established with considering the effects of monitoring voting device detection rate and false alarm rate.
The structure of this paper is organized as the following. The second part gives the GSPN model description of RVMCS; the third part specifically establishes a hierarchical GSPN model of RVMCS; the fourth part mainly analyzes the reliability and safety analysis of RVMCS; the fifth part makes the conclusions.
GSPN model description of RVMCS

Failure mechanism analysis of RVMCS
The processor, system disc, data discs, network interface card (NIC), and small computer system interface (SCSI) controllers compose of VMC hardware. There are four reasons that can lead to hardware failures during operation: imperfect designing, defect in production, over charging, and aging. When one of the drawbacks is induced by certain internal or external factors, performance of the hardware will be degraded. However, not all faults taking place will be transformed into system failures and need to be recovered by maintenance. A hardware fault which occurs just in a short period and vanishes with the disappearing of distributes subsequently is defined as hardware temporary fault (HTF). In this circumstance, VMC can operate normally and the hardware can fulfill its function because HTF can be removed automatically when external conditions related with the fault disappear. On the other hand, the system performance will degrade if the fault is permanent and the failed hardware needs to be repaired. In this case, failure of the hardware is called as hardware permanent failure (HPF).
As for the software, its failure mechanism is quite different from the hardware. Generally, defaults inevitably remain in the software bodies during software designing. Software defaults can be motivated by certain input. With activated defaults, the software will go into a disordered state. In this case, the software usually will not lose its function immediately and can be recovered by fault tolerant designs (such as recovery block, N-version programming software) if the error can be detected. In this case, software disorder is named as software temporary fault (STF). Otherwise, the disorder will expand until the specification requirement is dissatisfied, which is named as software failure (SF). If a software failure occurs, RVMCS performance and reliability will drop gradually and the system needs to restart to recover operation.
Taking consideration of the interactions between hardware and software faults and the influence of limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of FMD, the failure mechanism of RVMCS is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
In Fig. 1 , RW presents the RVMCS operating state. For RVMCS hardware, excessive interior and exterior stresses (such as high temperature, excessive vibration, abnormal air pressure, and unexpected electric stress) will cause hardware performance to degrade, and then the hardware temporary failure happens, i.e., the transmission from RW to HTF in Fig. 1 . If the stresses continue impacting on the hardware for a while, VMS will fail, i.e., the transmission from HTF to RF in Fig. 1 . As for the software, the software defaults are activated by certain input. Then, the software will go into a disordered inner state, i.e., STF in Fig. 1 . If the disorder continues expanding, the software failure occurs; therefore, the transmission from STF to RF takes place.
Besides the hardware and the software fail independently, the interactions between hardware and software faults are significant in RVMCS. An error due to the activation of a temporary hardware fault (such as processor overheating, buffer overflowing) may propagate to the hosted software and lead the software entering the disordered inner state, i.e., the transmission process from HTF to STF in Fig. 1 . On the other hand, the uncorrected software faults' continuous influences will cause the hardware performance degrading. This interaction process is illustrated as the transmission from STF to HTF in Fig. 1 .
Furthermore, the false alarming of FMD will influence utilization of single VMS, and then decrease the reliability of RVMCS. The missing detection of FMD brings dangerous operating state, and hinders the implementation of system reconstruction strategies.
GSPN model description of RVMCS
Assumptions
The analysis and results in this paper are based on the following assumptions. Assumption 3. VMC 1 and VMC 2 compose of warm-standby RVMCS. FMD is adopted in RVMCS to realize fault detection and isolation. FMD has limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability.
Definitions
Definition 1. The GSPN-based model of the VMC hardware is described as:
In the model, S H = {H_w, H_ab, H_re, H_fa, H_fr, H_de} is the marking set. The elements in S H describe the potential states of the VMC hardware. The detailed description to each element in S H is shown in Section 3.1. T H is the transition set of GSPN H which defines all dynamic processes in which the hardware fails and recovers. T H = T Ht [ T Hi , and T Ht \ T Hi = Ø. Here, T Ht = {t H1 , t H2 , t H3 , t H4 } defines the transition processes associated with transition rate and time, while T Hi = {t Hi1 , t Hi2 , t Hi3 , t Hi4 } defines the transition process in which the satisfied transition occurs instantaneously. F H is the arc set of the model; W H is the arc weight set, and all arc weights in F H are 1. The capacity function K H = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} defines capacities of each element in S H . M H0 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} defines the initial state of GSPN H . It is supposed that the initial state of the hardware is operational, i.e., #(H_w) = 1. K H ¼ fk H1 ; k H2 ; k H3 ; k H4 g describes the transition rate set that the different states in GSPN H change between each other. k H1 is the transition rate of the transmission from H_w to H_ab. The value of k H1 reflects the frequency that the destructive factors exert on the hardware.
Definition 2.
The GSPN-based model of the VMC software is described as:
In the model, S W = {S_op, S_ab, S_de, S_fr, S_dr, S_-fa, S_re} is the marking set. The elements in S W describe the potential states of the VMC software. The detailed description to each element in S W is shown in Section 3.2. T W is the transition set of GSPN W which defines all dynamic processes in which the software fails and restore.
Here, T Wt = {t W1 , t W2 , t W3 , t W4 , t W5 } defines the transition processes in GSPN W associated with transition rate and time, while T Wi = {t Wi1 , t Wi2 , t Wi3 , t Wi4 } is the transient transition set which defines the transition process in which the satisfied transition occurs instantaneously. F W is the arc set of the model; W W is the arc weight set, and all arc weights in F W are 1. The capacity function K W = {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1} defines capacities of each element in S W . M W0 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} defines the initial state of GSPN W . It is supposed that the initial state of the software is operational, i.e., #(S_op) = 1. K W ¼ fk S1 ; k S2 ; k S3 ; k S4 ; k S5 g describes the transition rate set associated with T Wt .
Definition 3. The GSPN-based model of single VMC is described as: where DEP describes the interaction model between hardware and software failures, which is
where Definition 4. The GSPN-based model of RVMCS is described as:
where GSPN V1 and GSPN V2 denote the models of VMC 1 and VMC 2 , respectively, FMD is
In the model, S F defines the states of RVMCS fault detection and isolation. T F is the transition set which defines all dynamic fault detection and isolation processes. F F is the arc set of the model; W F is the arc weight set, and all arc weights in F F are 1. The capacity function K F defines capacities of each element in S F . M F0 defines the initial state of FMD. K F gives the parameter set of fault detection rate and fault isolation rate.
GSPN model analysis of single VMC
GSPN model analysis of VMC hardware
According the definition of GSPN H , the GSPN model of the VMC hardware is established as in Fig. 2 .
According to GSPN H , M H0 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, i.e., #(H_w) = 1, and the VMC hardware is operational in the initial condition. In the hardware's subsequent operating, it could fail by the influence of excessive stress, and then a token is transmitted to H_ab from H_w, i.e., #(H_ab) = 1. The failure that the VMC hardware encounters may be HTF with the probability of Pr(t Hi2 ) or HPF with the probability of Pr(t Hi1 ), and Pr(t Hi1 ) + Pr(t Hi2 ) = 1. As for HPF (i.e., #(H_fr) = 1), it will be removed by restarting the hardware subsequently. The mean restarting time of the hardware is #(t H2 ) = 1=k H2 . As for HTF (#(H_de) = 1), it will be removed while excessive interior and exterior stresses disappear, and then the hardware will resume normal operating subsequently. The recovering rate of the hardware in HTF is #(t H3 ) = 1=k H3 . In addition, if excessive interior and exterior stresses continue impacting on the hardware for a period of time (#(t H4 ) = 1=k H4 ), HTF will eventually transmit into HPF, and then the hardware is restarted subsequently. Whether or not the interior and exterior stresses continue impacting is determined by Pr(t Hi3 ) and Pr(t Hi4 ), and Prðt Hi3 Þ þ Prðt Hi4 Þ ¼ 1.
It can be seen from the description of GSPN H that GSPN H has four steady states which are summarized in Table 1 .
According to Table 1 , the continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) model equivalent to GSPN H is shown in Fig. 3 .
Based on the CTMC model of the VMC hardware, the state transition equation is obtained as: 
M H0 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} i.e., 
The probabilities of the VMC hardware states can be obtained: Performance of the hardware degrades due to the influence of disturbances, and the hardware will recover later after disturbances vanishing 3
Performance of the hardware degrades due to the influence of disturbances, and the hardware will lose its function later due to continuous impact of disturbances 4
The hardware fails due to the influence of disturbances. It should be repaired and then recover to normal operating state
where
Given the parameters of the VMC hardware model as shown in Table 2 , the probabilities of the VMC hardware states can be calculated.
So,
Although the performance of the VMC hardware is decreased due to the hardware operating in the performance degradation state (such as slow processing speed of the central processor), the VMC hardware can still fulfill its basic functions, and with the destructive factor vanishing, some HTFs are ultimately removed and the hardware restores to good condition. Therefore, only HPF is taken as the failure status of the hardware. The reliability of the hardware is:
GSPN model analysis of VMC software
According to the definition of GSPN W , the GSPN model of the VMC software is established as Fig. 4 shows. According to GSPN W , M W0 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, i.e., #(S_op) = 1, and the VMC software is operational in the initial condition. In the hardware's subsequent operating, it could fail by error inputs, and then a token is transmitted to the place S_ab, i.e., #(H_ab) = 1. Subsequently, the VMC operating system detects this fault with self-checking software, and confirms whether this fault can be recovered by the software itself. The mean detection time of the operating system is #(t W2 ) = 1=k W2 . The fault that the VMC software encounters may be STF with the probability of Prðt Wi2 Þ or SF with the probability of Prðt Wi1 Þ, and Prðt Wi1 Þ þ Prðt Wi2 Þ ¼ 1. As for SF (i.e., #(S_fr) = 1), it will be removed by restarting the operating system software subsequently. The mean restarting time of the software is #(t W3 ) = 1=k W3 . As for STF (#(S_dr) = 1), it will be removed with recovery block (RB) or N-version programming software (NVP), and the software will recover to normal operating subsequently. The recovering time of the software in STF is #(t W4 ) = 1=k W4 . However, if RB or NVP cannot remove the software fault and the error input Table 3 .
According to Table 3 for the description of software states, the CTMC model equivalent to the GSPN model is shown in Fig. 5 .
Based on the CTMC model of the VMC software, the state transition equation is obtained as: 
The probabilities of the VMC software states can be obtained:
Given the parameters of the VMC software model as shown in Table 4 , the probabilities of the VMC hardware states can be calculated. So,
Although the performance of airborne computer software decreases, such as the operation speed reduces or part of the software module cannot be used normally, computer software can still complete the most basic functions, and software exception finally self-repairs and returns to its normal state with the running of airborne computer and the elimination of destructive factors in software operating environment. Thus, the reliability of the software is:
GSPN comprehensive model of VMC
According the definition of GSPN V , the GSPN model of single VMC is established as Fig. 6 shows. In GSPN V , the transition set of T D defines all interactions between hardware and software failures. If the VMC hardware is in the state of HTF, i.e., #(H_re) = 1, the abnormality of the hardware may affect the normal operation of the software, namely, hardware faults propagate to the software, and thus #(HtoS) = 1. With the exception influenced by HTF, the software may encounter the following possible behaviors:
(1) #(S_ab) = 1, iff #(S_op) = 1. In this case, the exception input from HTF causes operational software disorder, and then the VMC operating system detects this fault with self-checking software subsequently. (2) #(S_dr) = 1, iff #(S_ab) = 1. In this case, the exception input from HTF causes abnormal software disorder further. Then the VMC operating system attempts to rectify this fault with RB or NVP. (3) #(S_fr) = 1, iff #(S_ab) = 1. In this case, the exception input from HTF causes abnormal software failures directly and totally.
Moreover, if the VMC hardware is in the state of HPF, #(H_fr) = 1, #(Bd) = 1. The model clears away all tokens in S W with transitions of t HtSi5 -t HtSi9 . When the hardware recovers after restarting or maintenance, i.e., #(H_w) = 1, VMC will restart with the mean rate of #(t restart ), and then #(H_w) = 1, and #(S_op) = 1. On the other hand, if the VMC software is faulty, i.e., #(S_fr) = 1, the abnormality of partial hardware (such as abnormal temperature rising of CPU) and performance degradation of the hardware will occur. The mean time that SF impacts on the hardware is #(t StH ) = 1=k StH .
Given the parameters of the VMC model as shown in Table 5, the probabilities of the VMC states is listed in Table 6 .
To single VMC, it can be seen by analyzing the states of GSPN V shown in Table 6 that the real failure of the VMC generally includes the following three conditions. (1) The VMC hardware is in the state of HPF, i.e., M 3 in Table 6 . In this case, the VMC stops and waits the hardware finishing maintenance. The mean recovering time of the VMC in this case is t repair ¼ 1=k H2 . (2) The VMC software is in the state of SF, i.e., M 10 , M 13 , M 14 , and M 16 in Table 6 . In this case, the VMC stops and waits the hardware restarting. The mean recovering time of the VMC in this case is t rebost ¼ 1=k W3 . (3) The VMC finishes maintenance and restarts, i.e., M 7 in Table 6 . The mean recovering time of the VMC in this case is t restart ¼ 1=k restart .
Therefore, the real reliability of the VMC is
Fig . 7 shows the variation curve of respective state reliability of single airborne computer with the change of mean time between hardware failures.
As shown in Fig. 7 , the reliability of the VMC increases with the growth of hardware MTBF. Due to the interactions between hardware and software faults, the real reliability of the VMC is obviously lower than the product of hardware and software reliabilities.
The reliabilities of hardware, software, and VMC vs MTBF of the software are illustrated in Fig. 8 .
As shown in Fig. 8 , the reliability of the VMC increases with the growth of software MTBF. Due to the interactions between hardware and software, the real reliability of the VMC is obviously lower than the product of hardware and software reliabilities. However, with the growth of software reliability, the effect that a software fault exerts on the hardware correspondingly reduces, and the real reliability of the VMC constantly approaches the product of hardware and software reliabilities.
In order to simplify the reliability analysis of RVMCS, it is supposed that the VMC has only two states: failed and operational. Fig. 9 describes the simplified GSPN V with equivalent mean failure rate k d and mean recovering rate l d . Simplified GSPN V is a basic repairable system. V up in Fig. 9 denotes the operational state of the VMC, and V dn denotes the failed state of the VMC. The most important thing about the simplified model is to determine equivalent failure rate k d and maintenance rate l d .
Simplified GSPN reliability model of the VMC is a basic repairable system model. V up represents that the VMC is operational, and V dn represents that the VMC is faulty. Therefore, equivalent failure rate and recovering rate need to be identified in the simplified model.
By effective state analysis of GSPN V , VMC failed states include: M 3 , M 7, M 10 , M 13 , M 14 , and M 16 , among which, the mean recovering time in M 3 is t repair , the mean recovering time in M 7 is t restart , and the mean recovering time of M 10 , M 13 , M 14 , and M 16 is t rebost ; therefore, the expected value of mean recovering time is:
Take l d = 1/T as the mean VMC recovering rate. According to the theory of repairable system, the reliability of the VMC is:
Thus, equivalent failure rate k d of simplified GSPN V can be identified.
From Tables 1, 3 and 5, we can obtain:
GSPN model of VMC with FMD
In order to effectively monitor VMC operating state, FMD, such as BIT and MVD, are usually installed in vehicle manage- ment system (VMS). Considering the effects of fault monitoring coverage and false alarming rate of FMD, the GSPN model of VMC is established as shown in Fig. 10 . In the GSPN model of VMC with FMD, the value of #(V 1 . vup ) is the indicator to identify VMC failure undetected state. Pr(t d ) defines the fault monitoring coverage that FMD can successfully detect VMC's faults, and thus Pr(t ud ) is the fault undetected probability of FMD, and Pr(t ud ) + Pr(t d ) = 1. If VMC encounters a failure, i.e., #(V 1 . dn = 1) = 1, the failure will be detected by FMD with the probability of Pr(t d ), and then #(V 1 . DF ) = 1 and #(V 1 . vup ) = 0. Otherwise, the failure will not be detected by FMD with the probability of Pr(t ud ), and then #(V 1 . EF ) = 1 and #(V 1 . vup ) = 1. If VMC in failure undetected state is very dangerous to airplanes, it is a serious threat to flight safety.
On the other hand, the value of #(V 1 . vdn ) is the indicator to identify the state that the operational VMC is identified incorrectly as failed by FMD. Pr(t va ) defines the false alarming probability that FMD incorrectly identifies operational VMC as failed VMC, and thus Pr(t nva ) is the probability that FMD correctly identifies operational VMC, and Pr(t va ) + Pr(t nva ) = 1. If VMC is operational, i.e., #(V 1 .up = 1) = 1, the operational VMC may be identified incorrectly as failed by FMD with the probability of Pr(t va ), and then #(V 1 . DF ) = 1 and #(V 1 . vdn ) = 1. The bigger false alarming probability of FMD will decrease the utilization of VMC; therefore, decreasing the false alarming probability of FMD becomes an important task in FMD design.
Given Pr(t va ) = 0.1 and Pr(t ud ) = 0.15, 21 reachable markings of models is available, of which 4 effective states are shown in Table 7 .
It can be found from the states of the GSPN model of VMC with FMD in Table 7 that M 1 represents that the VMC is operational without false alarming and M 2 represents that the failed VMC is successfully detected by FMD. M 3 represents that the failed VMC is undetected by FMD and airborne panel displays that the VMC is still operational. Therefore, M 3 is extremely dangerous to airplanes and it is a serious threat to flight safety. M 4 represents that the operational VMC is incorrectly identified as failed by FMD and airborne panel displays that the VMC is unavailable. It decreases the utilization of VMC.
If M 3 and M 4 occur, the false operations by the airplane pilot will be taken. Especially, M 3 will bring potential fatal failures. Therefore, the probability of M 3 should be reduced as much as possible in FMD design. M 4 will reduce actual efficiency of VMC; therefore, the probability of M 4 should be reduced as designing FMD.
With FMD, the real reliability of VMC is R Given that the false alarming probability of FMD is 0.1, the state probabilities of VMC with FMD vs fault monitoring coverage are shown in Fig. 11 .
It can be found from Fig. 11 that the actual reliability of VMC with FMD is not increased but reduced with the decline of fault monitoring coverage Pr(t d ). This result is because of the fact that the operational time of VMC will increase for more failures are detected and removed successfully due to larger fault monitoring coverage. The increase of VMC operating time adds the probability that FMD incorrectly identifies operational VMC as failed VMC. In other words, the probability of VMC in false alarming state is increased accordingly.
Based on this result, it cannot improve VMC's reliability and utility really only by increasing the fault monitoring coverage but not decreasing the false alarming probability of FMD.
Given that the fault monitoring coverage is 0.15, the state probabilities of VMC with FMD vs false alarming probability are shown in Fig. 12 .
It can be found from Fig. 12 that the actual reliability of VMC with FMD is reduced with the increase of false alarming probability Pr(t va ). The probabilities of M 2 and M 3 are nearly changeless with the increase of false alarming probability. However, the probability of VMC in invalid states increases obviously. Some of invalid states of VMC are caused by actual failures, but considerable invalid states are caused by FMD false judgment.
GSPN model of RVMCS
GSPN model of ideal RVMCS
Without FMD, the ideal GSPN model of RVMCS is shown in Fig. 13 .
As shown in Fig. 13 , RVMCS is operational if any of VMC 1 and VMC 2 is operational, i.e., #(S. up = 1), iff #(V 1 . up = 1) or #(V 2 . up = 1). RVMCS is failed if both of VMC 1 and VMC 2 are failed, i.e., #(S. dn = 1), iff #(V 1 . dn = 1) and #(V 2 . dn = 1).
It can be seen by model simulation that the model has 13 reachable states among which four effective states can be identified as shown in Table 8 .
According to Table 8 , M 1 represents that both of VMC 1 and VMC 2 are operational. In this case, RVMCS is operational. M 2 represents that VMC 2 is operational but VMC 1 is failed. M 3 represents that VMC 1 is operational but VMC 2 is failed. In the cases of M 2 and M 3 , although the performance of RVMCS degrades due to one of VMCs is failed, RVMCS can still perform its basic flight control functions. Therefore, the available states of RVMCS include M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 , i.e.,
Compared with Eq. (17), an ideal redundant VMC system greatly improves the reliability of single VMC.
GSPN Model of RVMCS with FMD
Taking the influences of limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of FMD into account, the GSPNbased reliability model of RVMCS can be established as shown in Fig. 14 .
Given Pr(t va ) = 0.1 and Pr(t ud ) = 0.15, the number of reachable states is 70. It can be seen by model simulation that the model has 70 reachable states. Among them, 13 effective states can be identified as shown in Table 9 .
As shown in Table 9 , M 1 presents that both of VMCs are operational, so accordingly, RVMCS operates well. M 2 and M 3 present that one VMC operates well but the other fails, Fig. 12 State probabilities of VMC with FMD vs false alarming probability. Due to the influences of limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of FMD, the failure undetected states and false alarming states inevitably exist in RVMCS. According to Table 9 , the probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states and RVMCS false alarming states are
Given that the false alarming probability of FDM is 0.1, the probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states and RVMCS false alarming states versus the fault monitoring coverage are shown in Fig. 15 .
It can be seen from Fig. 15 that the probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states decrease with the increase of undetected rate of FDM, but the probabilities of RVMCS false alarming states increase. This result is because of the fact that the operational time of RVMCS will increase for more failures are detected and removed successfully due to larger fault monitoring coverage. The increase of RVMCS operating time adds the probability that FMD incorrectly identifies operational VMC as failed VMC. In other words, the probability of RVMCS in false alarming states is increased accordingly.
Given that the fault monitoring coverage of FDM is 0.85, the probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states and RVMCS false alarming states versus the false alarming probability are shown in Fig. 16 .
It can be seen from Fig. 16 that the probabilities of RVMCS false alarming states increase with the increase of false alarming probability, but the probabilities of RVMCS failure undetected states decline.
According to the states of RVMCS with FMD, the performance of RVMCS in M 2 and M 3 is degraded due to one failed VMC. The utility of RVMCS in M 4 , M 7 , and M 9 is reduced due to the fact that one operational VMC is identified incorrectly as failed by FMD. Although RVMCS in M 2 , M 3 , M 4 , M 7 , and M 9 will reduce its performance or utility to a certain extent, RVMCS is still available to VMS; therefore, the actual reliability of RVMCS can be obtained as
Compared with Eq. (19) , RVMCS with FMD is less reliable than the ideal RVMCS. This is resulted from the influences of fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of FMD. Furthermore, due to the influence that one failed VMC is undetected by FMD, RVMC operating in the state of M 5 and M 6 will produce a potential threat to the safety of VMS. Therefore, the probability that RVMCS operates with risk of safety is P rs RVMCS ¼ PrðM 5 Þ þ PrðM 6 Þ ¼ 0:000202 ð24Þ
Moreover, due to the influence that one failed VMC is undetected and the other operational VMC is identified incorrectly as failed by FMD, RVMC operating in the state of M 11 and M 12 will produce a fatal threat to the safety of VMS. Therefore, the probability that RVMCS operates with fatal danger is
RVMCS operating with both risk of safety and fatal danger will influence the pilot's judgment and then lead to the pilot's later dangerous operating. Therefore, P rs RVMCS and P fd RVMCS must be reduced by efficient technical methods during FMD design.
Conclusions
By advantages of generalized stochastic Petri nets, this paper establishes the reliability and safety models of redundant vehicle management computer system, and analyzes the potential threats to flight control system. The main contributions and conclusions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(1) As a typical fault dependency system, the reliability of VMC is not the product of hardware reliability and software reliability. The interactions between hardware and software faults can reduce the real reliability of VMC obviously. How to reduce the interactions between hardware and software faults (such as good thermal design of VMC) should be studied during VMC design. (2) Although redundant techniques adopted in VMC can improve VMC's reliability to a certain extent, failure undetected states and false alarming states inevitably exist in RVMCS due to the influences of limited fault monitoring coverage and false alarming probability of FMD. RVMC operating in some failure undetected states will produce a fatal threat to the safety of VMS. RVMC operating in some false alarming states will reduce utility of RVMCS obviously. Therefore, the performance and efficiency of FMD should be carefully designed and verified during FMD design.
The results abstracted in this paper can guide reliable VMC and efficient FMD designs. The methods adopted in this paper can also be used to analyze other intelligent systems' reliability.
